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I. 
When I was asked to give the John Dewey L e c t u r e , I cons idered it a marve lous 
oppor tun i ty to r e tu rn to my i n t e l l e c t u a l roo t s , for I s t a r t e d my philosophic c a r e e r by 
wri t ing my d i s s e r t a t i o n on John Dewey. " R e t u r n " is not qu i te the a p p r o p r i a t e 
express ion , for e v e r y t h i n g tha t I 've wr i t t en s ince the early 1950s has been infused and 
informed by the spir i t of Dewey, and more genera l ly what I t a k e to be best and most 
enduring in the p r a g m a t i c t r a d i t i o n . I know all too well t ha t for a long t ime Dewey has 
been cons ide red r a t h e r passe , a fuzzy -minded th inker who perhaps had his hea r t in t he 
right p l ace , but not his head . And t h e r e a r e those who still think tha t Dewey is t he 
source of t he ills t h a t have plagued American e d u c a t i o n . I think this is a s l ande r . More 
boldly, I be l ieve t h a t Dewey and the p ragma t i c th inkers a r e not only not passe , but 
tha t they were rea l ly ahead of their t imes . What I see happening now is a 
r e - e m e r g e n c e of p r a g m a t i c t h e m e s . It is almost as if the d i a l ec t i c of c o n t e m p o r a r y 
philosophy in i ts d ive r se modes keeps leading us back to the point of d e p a r t u r e for t h e 
p r agma t i c t h i n k e r s . Dewey was never more r e l e v a n t than he is today—in helping us to 
gain some p e r s p e c t i v e , some o r i e n t a t i o n on our ex t remely con fused and c h a o t i c cu l tu ra l 
cond i t i on . This is t h e thes is t ha t I want to exp lo re with you. 
Let me begin with a claim t h a t Dewey made in Democracy and E d u c a t i o n . "If we 
a re willing to c o n c e i v e educa t ion as the p rocess of forming fundamen ta l d isposi t ions , 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and emot iona l , t oward n a t u r e and fe l low men, philosophy may even be 
de f ined as t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r y of educa t ion . "^ This was a c e n t r a l motif in Dewey, and it 
has a c lass ica l r ing. Dewey, who ca l l ed for a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n in philosophy, or r a t h e r of 
philosophy, never abandoned the idea tha t philosophy as the "cr i t ic ism of c r i t i c i sms" 
ought to be c o n c e r n e d with nur tu r ing p r ac t i c a l wisdom, with the fo s t e r i ng of " c r e a t i v e 
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r e f l e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e . " He was suspicious of the t e n d e n c y of phi losophers to become 
exclusively p reoccup ied with the "problems of phi losophy" and to fo rge t about t h e 
"problems of men"—the p rob lems of human beings in their e v e r y d a y l ives. He r e j e c t e d 
the very idea of philosophy as some sor t of super s c i e n c e with i ts own d i s t i nc t i ve 
problems and methods—a d isc ip l ine t ha t has special a c c e s s to Truth and R e a l i t y . He 
thought tha t philosophy is—or r a t h e r ought to be—grounded in the d e e p e s t cu l tu ra l 
c o n f l i c t s of o n e ' s t ime; s eek ing to d e f i n e and c l a r i f y them, to provide us with gu idance 
in resolving them and enab l ing us to work toward a more des i r ab l e f u t u r e . He was a 
r e l en t l e s s c r i t i c of what he took to be the s t e r i l i t y of ep i s temology and t h e obsession 
of so much of modern phi losophy with " t h e ques t for c e r t a i n t y " and " the s p e c t a t o r 
theory of knowledge . " He be l i eved , to use the Heidegger ian express ion , t h a t we a r e 
" t h r o w n " in to the world with no abso lu te founda t ions or abso lu t e ends . But th is should 
ne i the r be a c a u s e for r ad i ca l skept ic i sm nor d i spa i r . For all of Dewey ' s emphas is on 
f u t u r e c o n s e q u e n c e s he knew t h a t we a r e a lways being shaped by inhe r i t ed t r a d i t i o n s . 
It is the c o n s t a n t task of t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t he p r e s e n t t h a t was his c e n t r a l 
c o n c e r n . What he once w r o t e about William James might well be said about Dewey 
h imse l f . 
And long a f t e r "p ragmat i sm" in any sense save as an app l i ca t ion of 
his We l t anschauung shall have passed into a not unhappy obl ivion, 
t he f u n d a m e n t a l idea of an open un iverse in which u n c e r t a i n t y , 
c h o i c e , h y p o t h e s e s , nove l t i e s and poss ib i l i t ies a r e n a t u r a l i z e d will 
remain a s s o c i a t e d with the name of James ; t he more he is s tudied 
in his h i s to r i c s e t t i n g the more original and dar ing will the idea 
a p p e a r . 
Like P e i r c e and J a m e s , Dewey emphas ized tha t the cosmos and our e x p e r i e n c e is 
an i n e x t r i c a b l e mix tu re of the s t ab l e and the p r e c a r i o u s . We a r e ne i the r simply 
p lay th ings of f o r c e s which a r e a lways working behind our backs nor c r e a t u r e s who can 
gain c o m p l e t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g and con t ro l over our de s t i n i e s . We a r e a lways c o n f r o n t e d 
with u n c e r t a i n t y and c h o i c e . 
- 3 -
Dewey knew tha t much of modern philosophy and c u l t u r e have been plagued by 
"The C a r t e s i a n Anxie ty"—the grand E i t h e r / O r . As 1 have w r i t t e n e l s e w h e r e , "e i the r 
t h e r e is some suppor t for our being, a f ixed foundat ion for our knowledge , or we 
cannot e s c a p e the f o r c e s of da rkness tha t enve lope us with madness , with i n t e l l e c tua l 
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and moral chaos . " In both word and deed , Dewey sought to exorc i se this anx ie ty , to 
c u r e us of the conv ic t i on tha t t he se a r e the only a l t e r n a t i v e s open to us. 
He shared with P e i r c e the belief tha t "we cannot begin with comple t e doubt . We 
must begin with all t h e p re jud ices which we ac tua l ly have when we en t e r upon the 
study of phi losophy. These p re jud ices a re not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they a re 
things which it does not occur to us can be ques t ioned . " But a l though we can never 
e scape f rom our h i s to r i ca l s i t u a t e d n e s s , we can risk, t e s t , and modify our p re judgment s 
through communal c r i t i c a l inqu i ry . Dewey had a s t rong sense of both the h i s to r i c i ty and 
con t ex tua l i sm of all inquiry and e x p e r i e n c e , but he was well a w a r e of , and deeply 
opposed what Karl Popper has ca l led the "Myth of the Framework , " a metaphor which 
sugges ts t ha t "we a r e pr i soners caught in the f r amework of our theor i e s ; our 
e x p e c t a t i o n s ; our pas t e x p e r i e n c e s ; our language";^ and tha t we a re so locked into 
these f r a m e w o r k s we c a n n o t communica t e with those encased in " rad ica l ly" d i f f e r e n t 
f r a m e w o r k s or pa rad igms . My own belief is t ha t a primary reason why phi losophers 
have r e c e n t l y become so obsessed with radica l re la t iv ism and incommensurabi l i ty is 
tha t this r e f l e c t s what is happening in our eve ryday lives where we e x p e r i e n c e the 
phenomenon of becoming e n t r e n c h e d in l imited languagues , hor izons , and parad igms . 
Even the te rm "d ia logue" has been debased so tha t it f r e q u e n t l y means l i t t l e more than 
a t t e m p t i n g to man ipu la te each o t h e r . But for Dewey genuine communica t ion , d ia logue, 
c r i t i c a l e n c o u n t e r based upon mutual unders tand ing is a lways a real poss ib i l i ty , but it 
is a possibi l i ty tha t r equ i r e s pas s iona te p r a c t i c a l commitment to be r e a l i z e d . 
There is more than a verbal t i e b e t w e e n the words common, 
communi ty , and communica t i on . Men live in a communi ty in v i r t ue 
of the things which they have in common; and communica t ion is 
the way in which they come to possess things in common. What 
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they must have in common in order to form a communi ty or soc ie ty 
a r e a i m s , b e l i e f s , a s p i r a t i o n s , k n o w l e d g e — a c o m m o n 
unde r s t and ing . . . . Such things canno t be passed physical ly f rom one 
to a n o t h e r , like br icks ; they canno t be shared as persons would 
share a pie by dividing it in to physical p i ece s . The communica t ion 
which insures p a r t i c i p a t i o n in a common unders t and ing is one 
which s e c u r e s similar emot ional and i n t e l l e c t u a l disgosi t ions—like 
ways of responding to e x p e c t a t i o n s and r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
And for Dewey, the very idea of such a communi ty and communica t ion—car r i ed to i ts 
logical conc lus ion—enta i l ed t h e ideal of a d e m o c r a t i c communi ty . Democracy for 
Dewey, was not pr imari ly a form of gove rnmen t or a se t of formal p r o c e d u r e s for 
making dec i s ions . It was a moral idea l , a way of l i f e . 
For every way of l i fe tha t fa i l s in democracy limits t h e c o n t a c t s , 
the e x c h a n g e s , t h e communica t ions , t he i n t e r a c t i o n s by which 
e x p e r i e n c e is s t e a d i e d while it is en la rged and e n r i c h e d . The task 
of th is r e l e a s e and en r i chmen t is one tha t has to be c a r r i e d on day 
by day . Since it is one tha t can have no end till e x p e r i e n c e i tself 
comes to an end , t he task of democracy is f o r e v e r t h a t of 
c r e a t i o n . . . w h i c h all s h a r e and to which all c o n t r i b u t e . 
What b r e a t h e s through t h e s e passages about communica t ion and d e m o c r a c y is t h e sense 
of communi ty as a p r a c t i c a l t a s k , a task requir ing commi tmen t and which "has to be 
c a r r i e d on day by day ." Dewey would have s t rongly endorsed a r e c e n t e loquen t 
s t a t e m e n t of the q u i n t e s s e n c e of democra t i c po l i t i c s . 
Democra t ic po l i t i c s is an e n c o u n t e r among people with d i f f e r i ng 
i n t e r e s t s , p e r s p e c t i v e s , and opinions—an e n c o u n t e r in which they 
recons ide r and mutual ly rev ise opinions and i n t e r e s t s , both 
individual and common . It happens a lways in a c o n t e x t of c o n f l i c t , 
i m p e r f e c t knowledge , and u n c e r t a i n t y , but where communi ty ac t ion 
is n e c e s s a r y . The reso lu t ions ach ieved a re a lways more or less 
t e m p o r a r y , sub jec t to r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and ra re ly unanimous . What 
m a t t e r s is not unanimi ty but d i s cou r se . The s u b s t a n t i v e common 
i n t e r e s t is only d i scovered or c r e a t e d in d e m o c r a t i c pol i t ica l 
s t r ugg l e , and it r emains c o n t e s t e d as much as s h a r e d . Far from 
being inimical to d e m o c r a c y , con f l i c t—hand led in d e m o c r a t i c ways, 
with openness and persuasion—is what makes d e m o c r a c y g work, 
what makes for t h e mutual revis ion of opinions and i n t e r e s t . 
Dewey was well a w a r e of all t h o s e t e n d e n c i e s in c o n t e m p o r a r y t echno log ica l soc i e t i e s 
which undermine , d i s t o r t , d e s t r o y , and inhibit the mate r i a l cond i t ions requ i red for 
d e m o c r a t i c commun i t i e s . And it is b e c a u s e of this t ha t he was so c o n c e r n e d with the 
c h a r a c t e r and f a t e of our schoo l s . 
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This theme was a l r eady c l ea r ly announced in 1897 in "My Pedagogic C r e e d " when 
he d e c l a r e d "much of p resen t educa t ion fa i ls because it neg lec t s this f undamen ta l 
pr inciple of the school as a form of community l i fe" and told us tha t "educa t ion must 
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be conce ived as a con t inu ing r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of expe r i ence . " Let us not fo rge t tha t 
from his ea r l i e s t r e f l e c t i o n s on educa t ion and the schools, Dewey not only opposed 
"deadness and dul lness , formalism and rou t ine" but also "sent imenta l ism"—"our 
educa t ion is t h r e a t e n e d with no g r e a t e r evil than sen t imenta l i sm." 
Ex t r eme d e p r e c i a t i o n s of t he child morally and in t e l l ec tua l ly , and 
sen t imen ta l i dea l i za t i ons of him, have their root in a common 
f a l l a c y . Both spring f rom taknp^ s t ages of a growth or movement 
as someth ing c u t off and f i xed . 
Dewey c o n s t a n t l y a d v o c a t e d the cu l t iva t ion of c r e a t i v e i n t e l l i gence . In te l l igence 
"is not t he f a c u l t y or i n t e l l e c t honored in t e x t b o o k s and neg lec ted e l s e w h e r e , but . . . i s 
the sum- to ta l of impulses , hab i t s , emot ions , r eco rds , and d iscover ies which f o r e c a s t 
what is des i rab le and undes i rab le in f u t u r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . . . . " ^ The meaning of 
i n t e l l i gence for Dewey is similar to what the Greeks cal led phrones i s—prac t i ca l -moral 
judgment . And like A r i s t o t l e , Dewey bel ieved it only comes into being when it is 
c a r e f u l l y n u r t u r e d , when moral c h a r a c t e r (hexis) is fo rmed . 
What Dewey w r o t e in 1917 s t r ikes me as even more a p p r o p r i a t e and r e l evan t for 
us t o d a y . 
We thus tend to combine a loose and i n e f f e c t i v e optimism and 
assent to the d o c t r i n e of t ake who t a k e can : a de i f i ca t i on of 
power . All peoples at all t imes have been narrowly rea l i s t i c in 
p r a c t i c e and have then employed idea l iza t ion to cover up in 
sen t iment and theory their b r u t a l i t i e s . But never , perhaps , has the 
t endency been so dangerous and so tempt ing as with ou r se lves . 
Fai th in t h e power of i n t e l l i g e n c e to imagine a f u t u r e which is t he 
p ro jec t ion of the des i r ab le in the p r e s e n t , and to invent t he 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s of i ts r e a l i z a t i o n , is our sa lva t ion . And it is a 
fa i th which must be nur tu red and m a ^ a r t i c u l a t e : surely a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y l a rge task for our phi losophy. 
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II. 
J ames o n c e w r o t e tha t "a man ' s vision is the g r e a t f a c t abou t him" and t h a t 
If we t a k e the whole h is tory of phi losophy, t he sys tems r educe 
themse lves to a f ew main types which, under all the t echn ica l 
ve rb i age in which the ingenious i n t e l l e c t of man enve lopes them, 
a re just so many visions, modes of fee l ing the whole push, and 
seeing the whole d n f t of l i fe , f o r ced on one by o n e ' s to t a l 
c h a r a c t e r and e x p e r i e n c e , and on the whole p r e f e r r ^ l - - t h e r e is no 
o ther t r u t h f u l word—as one ' s bes t working a t t i t u d e . 
There a r e many profess iona l ph i losophers who a re scanda l ized by th is c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n 
of phi losophy, but I have a lways f e l t t ha t what James says is both incis ive and h o n e s t . 
And ce r t a in ly—in this sense—Dewey was a man of vis ion. 
But what h a p p e n e d ? Why did Dewey f a d e from the Amer ican philosophic s c e n e ? 
Why is it t h a t Dewey, who inspired so many during his l i f e t ime , has become such a 
"marg ina l" f i g u r e ? For the b ru t a l t r u t h is t h a t Dewey has been s ca r ce ly t aken ser iously 
by p ro fes s iona l phi losophers—almost ruled out of the "canon" of read ing lists of our 
g r a d u a t e philosophy d e p a r t m e n t s . To proper ly answer t h e s e ques t ions would r equ i r e 
nothing less than an analys is of American c u l t u r e during the pas t f i f t y y e a r s . Let me 
fill in one small pa r t of this s tory—a s tory tha t can se rve as a pa rab l e for not only 
unde r s t and ing what has happened to us but also for grasping why I be l ieve the t ime is 
r ipe for a robust r e - a p p r o p r i a t i o n of the p r agma t i c sp i r i t . 
By the 1950s Dewey had a l ready been th rus t as ide to the margins of ma ins t r eam 
profess iona l phi losophy. The re was a new " tough-mindedness , " and the r e i t e r a t i o n of a 
p a t t e r n tha t has been r e p e a t e d over and over again in the cou r se of modern phi losophy. 
This p a t t e r n , exempl i f i ed by Desca r t e s in his Medi t a t ions , is one where t h e r e is 
profound d i s con t en t with prev ious s ty les of phi losophiz ing, an a t t e m p t to d iagnose 
prec i se ly what has gone wrong , a need to p lace philosophy on f i rmer founda t ions , to 
spec i fy what a r e and a re not l eg i t ima te philosophic problems, and to a r t i c u l a t e the 
c o r r e c t methods for solving and /o r dissolving them—so tha t philosophy will f inal ly 
e s c a p e being the endless b a t t l e g r o u n d of compe t ing opinions and discover a s e c u r e 
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p a t h w a y for achieving genuine knowledge . Not only Desca r t e s , but Spinoza, Hume, 
Kant , Husserl , logical pos i t iv i s t s and phenomenologis ts have all shared this basic 
c o n v i c t i o n . Indeed it is t h e typica l s t a n c e of most modern phi losophers . Ever s ince the 
rise of modern s c i ence , phi losophers have f r e q u e n t l y been on the de f ens ive , and have 
des i red to s ecu re the i r discipl ine on firm founda t i ons . Let us remember t h a t a l r eady 
during the 1930s, t he emigre phi losophers f rom Europe who were a s soc i a t ed with 
logical posi t ivism and empir ic ism w e r e becoming the new philosophic he roes in Amer ica . 
R e i c h e n b a c h , Feigl , Bergmann , C a r n a p , Tarski and Hempel (among o the r s ) we re rapidly 
rep lac ing t h e c lass ic American phi losophers as s e t t i ng the agenda for phi losophy. 
Logical posi t ivism in t h e mil i tant form of the Vienna C i r c l e or the polemical form of 
A.J . Ayer did not t a k e deep roo t s in Amer ica , but the posi t iv is t t emper and t h e legacy 
of t he phi losophy of the n a t u r a l s c i ences and logic did f lour i sh . There was even the 
c r e a t i o n of t he myth t h a t what was viable and enduring in the American p r a g m a t i c 
t r a d i t i o n was s t a t e d with g r e a t e r c l a r i t y and prec is ion by the logical empi r i c i s t s . A f t e r 
the Second World War, t h e r e was a growing c o n f i d e n c e among profess iona l 
ph i losophers . Yes, it was f e l t philosophy must give up i ts claims to syn thes i s , 
specu l a t i on , and "vision." Its domain needed to be severe ly r e s t r i c t e d to t h e analys is of 
well de f ined problems. But we presumably now had d iscovered the c o n c e p t u a l and 
logical too ls to make rea l p rogress in solving t h e ou t s t and ing problems of phi losophy. 
My c o n t e m p o r a r y , Richard R o r t y , has c a p t u r e d the mood of this t ime , when he 
wr i t e s : 
In 1951, a g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t who (like mysel f ) was in the process of 
learning abou t , or being c o n v e r t e d to , ana ly t i c philosophy, could 
still be l ieve t h a t t h e r e we re a f i n i t e number of d i s t inc t s p e c i f i a b l e 
philosophic problems to be resolved—problems which any ser ious 
ana ly t i c phi losopher would a g r e e to be t h e ou t s t and ing problems . 
For example , t h e r e was the problem of the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l 
cond i t iona l , t h e problem of whe the r an "emot ive" analysis of 
e th ica l t e rms was s a t i s f a c t o r y , Q u i n e ' s problem about the n a t u r e 
of a n a l y t i c i t y , and a f e w more . These were problems which f i t t e d 
nicely in to t h e vocabula ry of t h e pos i t iv i s t s . They could easi ly be 
seen as t h e f ina l , proper fo rmula t ion of problems which had been 
seen , as in a glass darkly by Le ibniz , Hume, and Kan t . F u r t h e r 
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t h e r e was a g r e e m e n t on what a solut ion to a phi losophic problem 
looked l ike—e.g. , Russell on d e f i n i t e de sc r ip t i ons , F r e g e on 
meaning and r e f e r e n c e , Tarski on t r u t h . In those days , when my 
g e n e r a t i o n was young, all the c o n d i t i o r ^ for a Kuhnian "normal" 
problem-solving d i sc ip l ine we re f u l f i l l e d . 
I ronical ly , Dewey ' s and J a m e s ' worst f e a r s about what might happen to philosophy in 
Amer ica with the g rowth of a c c d e m i c profess iona l i sm seemed to be coming t r u e with a 
v e n g e n c e . During the 1950s t h e r e was almost a scur ry ing to r e shape g r a d u a t e 
philosophy d e p a r t m e n t s in to " r e s p e c t a b l e " ana ly t i c d e p a r t m e n t s . The re we re , of c o u r s e , 
pocke t s of r e s i s t a n c e , but a t t he t ime those who res i s t ed this "new wave" f e l t t h a t 
they were on t h e d e f e n s i v e . P ro fess iona l phi losophers were t one deaf to Dewey 's 
warning when he w r o t e "I be l i eve t ha t philosophy in America will be lost b e t w e e n 
chewing a h i s to r i c cud long s ince r educed to woody f i b e r , or an apo loge t i c s for lost 
c a u s e s (lost to n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ) , or a s cho l a s t i c , s c h e m a t i c fo rmal i sm, unless it can 
somehow bring to consc iousnes s Amer i ca ' s own needs and i ts own implici t p r inc ip les of 
s u c c e s s f u l a c t i o n . " ^ As f a r as phi losophers were c o n c e r n e d , t h e philosophy of 
e d u c a t i o n was r e l e g a t e d to t h e dustbin of h i s to ry , along with much of po l i t i ca l and 
social phi losophy. 
I do not want to d e n i g r a t e the a c h i e v e m e n t s of ana ly t i c phi losophy, or what we 
have lea rned and c o n t i n u e to learn f rom i t . It c e r t a i n l y has brought a f i nes se of 
a r g u m e n t a t i o n to a whole v a r i e t y of i ssues . But it was the ideology of this new s ty le 
of phi losophy—its i n t o l e r a n c e to o ther s ty les of phi losophiz ing, i ts exc lus ionary t a c t i c s 
tha t were so o b j e c t i o n a b l e and soon exp loded . What has h a p p e n e d , even in ana ly t i c 
philosophy s ince those ea r ly days of a r r o g a n t optimism is a complex s t o r y . R o r t y ' s 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s is pe rhaps an e x a g g e r a t i o n , but is n e v e r t h e l e s s r e v e a l i n g . 
In the in t e r lock ing " c e n t r a l " a r e a s of ana ly t i c philosophy 
—epis temology , phi losophy of l anguage , and m e t a p h y s i c s — t h e r e a r e 
now as many pa rad igms as t h e r e a re major philosophy d e p a r t -
men t s . . . . Any problem tha t en joys a s imul taneous vogue in t en of 
the hundred or so " a n a l y t i c " philosophy d e p a r t m e n t s in Amer ica is 
doing e x c e p t i o n a l l y wel l . The f ie ld t h e s e days is a jungle of 
compe t ing r e s e a r c h p rograms which seem to have a sho r t e r and 
shor t e r h a l f - l i f e as t he years go by. . . . The re is no more consensus 
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about the problems and methods of philosophy in America today 
than t h e r e was in Germany in 1920.. . . The best hope for an 
American phi losopher is Andy Warhol 's promise t ha t shall a\\_ be 
s u p e r s t a r s , for approx ima te ly f i f t e e n minutes a p i e c e . 
R o r t y ' s ske tch may be an ove r s imp l i f i ca t i on , but 1 do not think it is a c a r i c a t u r e . 
It does not do jus t i ce to the a c h i e v e m e n t s of t he ana ly t ic s ty le of phi losophiz ing , and 
it fa i l s to t a k e a c c o u n t of t h e sheer va r i e ty of philosophy in Amer ica . For no school , 
o r i e n t a t i o n , or paradigm has ever comple te ly dominated the s c e n e . 
When Kuhn in The S t r u c t u r e of Sc i en t i f i c Revolu t ions desc r ibes what he ca l l s t he 
" response to cr i s i s , " he te l l s us: "The p ro l i f e r a t i on of compet ing a r t i c u l a t i o n s , the 
wil l ingness to t ry a n y t h i n g , t he express ion of explici t d i s c o n t e n t , the r e c o u r s e . . . t o 
d e b a t e over f u n d a m e n t a l s , all of t h e s e a r e symptoms of a t rans i t ion from normal to 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y resea rch . "* ' 7 Something like this ce r t a in ly seems to c h a r a c t e r i z e the 
p resen t philosophic s c e n e . When I said ea r l i e r t h a t the s tory of philosophy during t h e 
past t h i r t y yea rs might se rve as a p a r a b l e , I meant tha t the almost c h a o t i c babble of 
compe t ing voices is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the r ange of cu l tu ra l e x p e r i e n c e , including 
e d u c a t i o n . It has become increas ing ly f a sh ionab le to speak of our t ime as a 
" p o s t - e r a " — " p o s t - m o d e r n i t y , " " p o s t - s t r u c t u r a l i s t , " "pos t -empi r i c i s t , " " p o s t - W e s t e r n , " and 
even "pos t -ph i losoph ic , " but nobody seems to be able to proper ly c h a r a c t e r i z e this 
"pos t -e ra , "—and t h e r e is an inabi l i ty and anx ie ty in naming i t . F r a g m e n t a t i o n , 
j aggedness , d e c e n t e r i n g , d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , a f r e n e t i c giddy whirl of ove r tu rn ing seems to 
be the "common" e x p e r i e n c e of our t i m e . If we a re honest then I think we must r e a l i z e 
tha t the confus ion and chaos of our cu l tu ra l lives is itself a r e f l e c t i o n of what is 
happening in our e v e r y d a y lives where t h e r e is a spread of almost wild p lura l i sm. The re 
is a f u r t h e r i rony. For all t he squabbles among i n t e l l e c t u a l s , for all the i r t a lk of 
radica l c r i t i q u e s , the i r d i scourse does seem to be more and more r e m o t e f rom the fe l t 
needs and problems we e x p e r i e n c e eve ry day . 
We can roughly dis t inguish t h r e e responses to our c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n . There a r e 
those who p e r c e i v e it is a sign of dange rous wave or i r ra t iona l i sm and nihi l ism. Among 
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phi losophers t h e r e a r e those who think t h a t now more than ever we must be "guard ians 
of r eason , " upholding r igorous s t a n d a r d s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n and c l a r i t y . There a r e those 
who del ight in the p resen t d isorder and see it as l ibe ra t ing us f rom the exc lus ions , 
h i e r a r ch i e s , and bl indness of i nhe r i t ed p a t t e r n s of thought and l anguage . And t h e r e a r e 
those (I inc lude myself in this group) who think tha t while we must c o n f r o n t 
p e n e t r a t i n g c r i t i q u e s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , we can see the p re sen t as an oppor tun i ty and 
cha l l enge for r e c o n s t r u c t i o n — t h e type of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n tha t Dewey ca l led f o r . 
When R e c o n s t r u c t i o n in Phi losophy was republ ished in 1950, Dewey w r o t e a new 
in t roduc t ion in which he d e c l a r e d : 
Today R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Phi losophy is a more su i t ab le t i t l e than 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n _m Phi losophy. For the in t e rven ing e v e n t s have 
sharply d e f i n e d , have brought to a head , the basic p o s t u l a t e of t he 
t e x t : namely t h a t t he d i s t i nc t i ve o f f i c e , problems and sub jec t 
m a t t e r of phi losophy grow out of s t r e s ses and s t r a in s in the 
communi ty l i fe in which a given form of philosophy a r i ses , and 
t h a t , a cco rd ing ly , as i t s spec i f i c problems vary with the c h a n g e s in 
human l i fe t ha t a r e a lways going on and t h ^ a t t imes c o n s t i t u t e a 
c r i s i s and a tu rn ing point in human h i s to ry . 
There a re many signs t h a t we a r e now coming to a p p r e c i a t e what Dewey mean t when 
he w r o t e th is . Without denying the a p p a r e n t confus ion in philosophy and c u l t u r a l l i f e , 
what impresses me is t he way in which p r a g m a t i c t hemes keep s u r f a c i n g . 
Also, t h e r e is a growing sense t ha t p ro fess iona l phi losophy has become marginal t o 
what Ror ty ca l l s t he " c o n v e r s a t i o n of mankind," and a need for philosophy to c o n f r o n t 
again the problems of human beings . There is a growing r ea l i za t ion t h a t t he 
founda t iona l p r o j e c t s t ha t have marked so much of modern philosophy a r e i n t e l l e c t u a l 
dead ends . The re is an a w a r e n e s s tha t the d icho tomies and dual isms tha t have been the 
s t ap l e of modern philosophy a r e uns t ab l e and s h i f t i n g . There is an a w a r e n e s s t ha t 
philosophy must be wary of fa l l ing prey to the v a r i e t i e s of s c i en t i c i sm, t ha t philosophy 
itself d e g e n e r a t e s when it d e s p e r a t e l y t r i e s to ape the hard s c i e n c e s . The themes of 
communi ty and communica t i on a r e once again coming into the fo r eg round of d iscuss ion , 
with the Deweyean emphas is on the p r a c t i c a l task of nur tu r ing such commun i t i e s . For 
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the most omnious t h r e a t to our eve ryday l i fewor ld is the breakdown and d i s to r t ion of 
any form of r e cogn i zab l e communi ty l i f e . 
What I find exc i t ing in the c u r r e n t con fused s i tua t ion is how many d ive r se lines of 
inquiry lead us in this d i rec t ion—how we can even begin seeing an i n t e r w e a v i n g and 
c r i s s -c ross ing of phi losophic movements which until r ecen t ly have seemed to sha re 
l i t t l e in common. In t h e b reakup of the hegemony of "ana ly t ic phi losophy" much of 
what is margina l ized now seems to be becoming c e n t r a l . 
Cons ider for example the work of Hannah Arendt who a lways was—and still is—a 
marginal f igu re for many p ro fess iona l phi losophers and pol i t ical s c i e n t i s t s . She has 
provided us with one of the most moving and incisive analyses of public communi ty l i fe 
in which human beings f a c e each o t h e r , fo rm, t e s t , and pur i fy opinions when they 
c o n f r o n t each o ther as equa ls and seek to a rgue and ra t ional ly pe r suade each o t h e r . 
Act ion or prax is which she took to be the highest form of human ac t i v i t y only comes 
into being in those public spaces which a r e c r e a t e d where human beings appear to each 
o ther in the i r p lu r a l i t y . It is in such spaces t ha t public f r eedom becomes a t ang ib le 
worldly r e a l i t y . Arendt well knew how f r a g i l e such a space of f r eedom is and how 
much in the modern age consp i res aga ins t it and deforms i t . Yet such joint ac t ion 
rooted in the condi t ion of human p lura l i ty is a lways a real possibi l i ty which can break 
out in a spon taneous m a n n e r . This is what she took to be the lost t r e a s u r e of the 
revo lu t ionary sp i r i t . For Arend t , an exemplar of this revolu t ionary spirit was our own 
American r e v o l u t i o n . ^ 
A similar t heme is echoed by Hans Georg Gadamer . He, too, sees tha t in the 
c o n t e m p o r a r y t echno log ica l world, where we a r e always appeal ing to so-ca l led e x p e r t 
knowledge , t h e r e has been a d e f o r m a t i o n of prax is . He, too , seeks to r ecover and 
recla im the sense in which d ia logue is the very qu in t e s sence of our b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d ; 
d ia logue based on d i f f e r e n c e s but where we seek for mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g . In 
answer ing the ques t ion "What is p r a c t i c e ? " he te l ls us tha t it "is conduc t i ng oneself 
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and ac t ing in so l ida r i ty . . . [which] is t h e dec i s ive cond i t ion and basis of all social 
„20 
r eason . " 
Despi te the long-s tand ing d e b a t e b e t w e e n Habermas and G a d a m e r , Habermas does 
not e s sen t i a l ly d i s ag ree abou t G a d a m e r ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of genu ine d i a logue . He 
himself has sought to d i s c r i m i n a t e what he ca l l s " communica t ive a c t i o n " which is 
o r i en t ed to mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g f rom t h e type of "pu rpos ive - r a t i ona l " ac t ion which is 
o r i en t ed to s u c c e s s . He, t o o , like Dewey, sees the mul t i f a r ious ways in which such 
communica t ive ac t i on is t h r e a t e n e d in the c o n t e m p o r a r y world, and ca l l s for t h e need 
to o v e r c o m e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . We find a similar motif in a very 
d i f f e r e n t r eg i s t e r in Alasdair M a c l n t y r e when he conc ludes his A f t e r Vi r tue with the 
p lea - - "What m a t t e r s at this s t a g e is t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of local forms of communi ty 
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within which c iv i l i ty and t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral l i f e can be sus t a ined . . . . " 
C o m p a r e this with Dewey ' s s t a t e m e n t in The Publ ic and i t s Problems, when he 
te l l s us "Unless local communal l i fe can be r e s t o r e d , the public c anno t a d e q u a t e l y 22 
reso lve i ts most u rgen t p rob lem: to find and i d e n t i f y i t s e l f . " What Dewey mean t by 
communi ty l i fe has r e c e n t l y been given an e l egan t express ion when Michael Sandel 
c h a r a c t e r i z e s what he ca l l s t h e "s t rong v iew" of communi ty . 
On this s t rong v iew, to say t h a t the members of a soc i e ty a re 
bound by a sense of communi ty is not simply to say t h a t a g r e a t 
many of them p r o f e s s communi t a r i an s en t imen t s and pursue 
commun i t a r i an a ims, but r a t h e r t ha t they c o n c e i v e their 
i den t i t y—the sub j ec t and not just the ob j ec t of the i r f ee l ings and 
asp i ra t ions—as d e f i n e d to some e x t e n t by the communi ty of which 
they a r e a p a r t . 
Ro r ty , t oo , ca l l s for a " r e n e w e d sense of communi ty" and with a s e l f - consc ious 
a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t he p r a g m a t i c t r a d i t i o n , he d e c l a r e s : 
Our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with our communi ty—our soc i e ty , our pol i t ica l 
t r a d i t i o n , our i n t e l l e c t u a l he r i t age—is he igh tened when we see this 
communi ty as ou r s r a t h e r than n a t u r e ' s , shaped r a t h e r than 
found , . . . In t he end , the p r a g m a t i s t s tell us, t h a t what m a t t e r s is 
our loya l ty to o t h e r human beings c l i n g y t o g e t h e r aga ins t the 
da rk , not our hope of g e t t i n g th ings r i gh t . 
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I would even a rgue t h a t when we think through and work through all t he f a s h i o n a b l e 
ta lk of " p o s t - m o d e r n i t y " we come to a similar c lus te r of ins ights , emphases , and 
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c o n c e r n s . 
One must be e x t r e m e l y c a r e f u l h e r e . The d i f f e r e n c e s among the th inke r s I have 
c i t ed a r e as c o n s e q u e n t i a l as any th ing t h a t they share in common. We must be c a u t i o u s 
about smoothing out rea l d i s a g r e e m e n t s . But I hope , at l e a s t , I have sugges ted to you 
how many d i f f e r e n t vo ices a r e speaking to a conce rn tha t is at the very c e n t e r of the 
p r agma t i c t r a d i t i o n . 
III. 
The major point I want to emphas i ze can be seen in regard to the sh i f t ing 
meanings of p lura l i sm. Plural ism itself is pa r t of a much larger theme—one which is t he 
oldes t and deepes t in Western (and non-Wes te rn ) thinking—the theme of the one and 
the many. I speak of it as a t heme r a t h e r than a problem because it spins off 
innumerab le problems and it is a t heme with endless va r i a t ions . We find it a t t he c o r e 
of Greek phi losophy, d i s c e r n a b l e a l r eady in t h e f r agmen t s of the p r e - S o c r a t i c s . And 
a l though it has been played out and rep layed in such a b s t r a c t forms as the r e l a t ion of 
the one to the many, t h e r e l a t ion of sameness or iden t i ty and d i f f e r e n c e , t he universa l 
and the p a r t i c u l a r , it is also a t h e m e tha t has c o n c r e t e and p r ac t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s . It 
is f r e q u e n t l y the most vi ta l issue in po l i t i ca l , socia l , or e th ica l c o n c e r n s . Thus, for 
example , t h e r e a r e a whole r ange of pol i t ica l and social theor ies which s t r e s s t he 
c e n t r a l i t y of what is s h a r e d , held in common, and universal—so much so t h a t they 
endanger the i n t e g r i t y of what is d i f f e r e n t and genuinely plural among indiv iduals . And 
t h e r e a r e opposing d o c t r i n e s t ha t a r e so f i x a t e d on the i n t eg r i t y of what is individual 
and d i f f e r e n t tha t they canno t l eg i t ima t e ly a c c o u n t for what is genuinely common. 
The theme of t h e one and the many, and the a r t i cu l a t i on of a v iab le p lura l ism, 
was c e n t r a l for all t he major p r a g m a t i c t h i n k e r s . It is ev idenced in P e i r c e ' s l i f e - long 
s t rugg le aga ins t the v a r i e t i e s of nominalism which he took to be so pe rvas ive in modern 
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t h o u g h t . It is man i f e s t in his d e f e n s e of t he nonreduc ib i l i ty of t he t h r e e pr imary 
c a t e g o r i e s : F i r s tne s s , Secondness , and Th i rdness . For whe the r P e i r c e boldly s p e c u l a t e d 
about cosmologica l ques t ions , or exp lo red the phenomenology of e x p e r i e n c e , or 
e l a b o r a t e d a c o m p r e h e n s i v e theory of s igns , he a t t e m p t e d to show t h a t we c a n n o t 
a c c o u n t for the r e l e v a n t phenomena wi thou t an appeal t o this plural t r i ad i c s c h e m e . He 
was an incis ive c r i t i c of all t hose phi losophies which fa i led to do jus t i ce to the 
sameness and d i f f e r e n c e t h a t we e n c o u n t e r in e x p e r i e n c e and r e a l i t y . P e i r c e was also 
sens i t ive to the p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s of his t r i ad i c p lura l ism. This is ev iden t in his 
d e f e n s e of S c o t i s t i c r ea l i sm, for he a rgued tha t what is at issue is whe the r human 
beings a r e more than i so l a t ed individuals l imi ted to the i r se l f ish des i res and n e e d s . He 
was a la rmed t h a t the me taphys i ca l nominalism of his t ime r e f l e c t e d itself in what he 
ca l l ed " the d o c t r i n e of G r e e d . " 
One of t he most i n t e n s e phi losophic per iods in William J a m e s ' l i fe was consumed 
with s t ruggl ing with an a d e q u a t e " r e so lu t ion" of t he problem of t he one and the many— 
a per iod of r e f l e c t i o n t h a t cu lmina t ed in his Essays in Rad ica l Empiricism and A_ 
P lu ra l i s t i c Universe . It is a lmost as if all t he issues t ha t we re c e n t r a l to J a m e s ' 
th ink ing , w h e t h e r the i r or ig ins were psycho log ica l , ep i s t emolog ica l , m e t a p h y s i c a l , or 
mora l , c a m e in to focus in his d o c t r i n e of a p lura l i s t i c un ive r se . 
Dewey 's e n t i r e theory of e x p e r i e n c e was o r i en t ed by this c o n c e r n . He was a t once 
c r i t i c a l of t he t endenc i e s—espec i a l l y as m a n i f e s t e d in " t r a d i t i o n a l " empir ic ism —toward 
e x t r e m e a tomism, and the equa l ly pe rn ic ious t e n d e n c i e s in the v a r i e t i e s of idea l i sm, to 
smother all d i f f e r e n c e s in a s ingle "o rgan ic" t o t a l i t y . Dewey thought of e x p e r i e n c e , 
t r a n s a c t i o n s , and s i t ua t i ons as a via^ media b e t w e e n the Scylla and Cha rybd i s t h a t 
marked so much of phi losophic r e f l e c t i o n . 
What is most i m p o r t a n t abou t t he p r a g m a t i c under s t and ing of plural ism is the 
p r a c t i c a l tw i s t t h a t they g a v e to this t h e m e . This is e spec ia l ly c l ea r in Dewey, and in 
his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e m o c r a c y . There is no e s c a p e f rom the t ang led p lura l i ty of human 
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e x p e r i e n c e and f rom the mul t ip le i n t e r p e n e t r a t i n g forms of l i f e . There is no s ingle 
t o t a l i t y in which eve ry th ing can be encompassed . In moral , social , and pol i t ica l l i f e , 
pluralism means t h a t we must a lmost r e s p e c t and do jus t i ce to d i f f e r e n c e s , and seek to 
unde r s t and what p r e s e n t s i tself as o ther and alien without violent ly imposing our own 
blind p re jud i ces and ideo log ies . Our e x p e r i e n c e and the universe in which we live is an 
i n e x t r i c a b l e mix ture of t he s t a b l e and the p reca r ious , of law and c h a n c e or 
s p o n t a n e i t y . There is t e n d e n c y t oward c e n t r i f u g a l d e c e n t e r i n g and f r a g m e n t a t i o n t h a t 
can resu l t in a sol ips i t ic a tomism. And t h e r e is the oppos i te danger of e l imina t ing or 
obscur ing all real d i f f e r e n c e s in to a f a l s e t o t a l i t y . Anyone who has lived through the 
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y knows t h a t t h e s e a r e not just a b s t r a c t t h e o r e t i c a l poss ib i l i t i es , but 
r a t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z e the p r a c t i c a l socia l r ea l i t y in which we have lived our l ives . But 
plural ism for the p r a g m a t i s t s never meant a se l f -enc losed re la t iv ism where we a r e 
f o r e v e r doomed to be p r i soners l imi ted to our own concep tua l schemes , f r a m e w o r k s , or 
ho r i zons . Such a form of re la t iv i sm is p rec i se ly what the p r agma t i s t s we re c o n s t a n t l y 
c o m b a t t i n g . Long b e f o r e the c u r r e n t f a sc ina t ion (obsession?) with rad ica l 
incommensurab i l i ty , Dewey was a w a r e of the danger of the type of d e g e n e r a t e 
pluralism t h a t would block communi ty and communica t ion . He was pe r sp icac ious in 
seeing th is not pr imari ly as a t h e o r e t i c a l problem, but as a p r ac t i c a l problem—a 
problem t h a t demands working toward a t ype of soc ie ty in which we can at once 
r e s p e c t and even c e l e b r a t e d i f f e r e n c e s and p lura l i ty but a lways s t r ive to unde r s t and 
and seek a common ground with what is o the r and d i f f e r e n t . 
At a l a te r s t a g e in t h e deve lopmen t of American though t , "plural ism" took on very 
d i f f e r e n t c o n n o t a t i o n s . It was a s soc i a t ed with a " t heo ry" of so-ca l led d e m o c r a t i c 
pol i t ics in which the pol i t ica l a r e n a was seen as a market p lace for nego t i a t i ng 
compe t ing plural i n t e r e s t s of individuals , g roups , and c l a s se s . Insofar as this " t h e o r y " 
was i n t e n d e d to desc r ibe and a c c o u n t for what happens in our pol i t ica l l i f e , it has been 
exposed by i ts c r i t i c s as an ideologica l m y s t i f i c a t i o n . For it glossed over and c o n c e a l e d 
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hidden forms of power and d o m i n a t i o n . It was one of those " i dea l i z a t i ons " t h a t cove r 
up " b r u t a l i t i e s . " 
But now we a r e t h r e a t e n e d by what I ea r l i e r ca l led "wild p lura l i sm" which has 
i n f e c t e d almost eve ry a s p e c t of our e v e r y d a y lives and has spread to v i r tua l ly every 
a r e a of human c u l t u r e . This is a p lural ism in which we a r e so enc losed in our own 
f r a m e w o r k s and our own po in t s of view t h a t we seem to be losing the c iv i l i ty , d e s i r e , 
and even the ab i l i ty to c o m m u n i c a t e and sha re with o t h e r s . It can be f a c i l e and 
dange rous to g e n e r a l i z e abou t a c u r r e n t mood. But we do seem to be living th rough a 
t ime when t h e r e is a wild f l u c t u a t i o n b e t w e e n the anx ie ty and c e l e b r a t i o n of r ad ica l 
d i f f e r e n c e s . T h e r e is a deep suspicion of all forms of what Lyota rd ca l l s 
" m e t a n a r r a t i v e s " — g r a n d s t o r i e s which t ry to make sense of what is happening in 
h i s t o r y . The re is an a lmost i n s t i n c t i v e r e a c t i o n aga ins t any and all a sp i r a t i ons t o w a r d 
un ive r sa l i t y and t o t a l i t y . This is one of t he many reasons why t h e r e is so much 
d i s e n c h a n t m e n t with the En l igh t enmen t t r ad i t i on and what has come to be ca l led 
"mode rn i t y . " In pa r t th is is a l e g i t i m a t e r e a c t i o n aga ins t the t e n d e n c i e s t o w a r d t o t a l 
s chemes and t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m — w h e t h e r soc ia l , po l i t i ca l , or t h e o r e t i c a l . For we have all 
pa in fu l ly wi tnessed how eas i ly c la ims to to t a l i t y—even in the name of human 
emanc ipa t i on—turn in to the i r oppos i te and become r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s for v io lence and 
t e r r o r . What does appear t o be d i s t i n c t i v e about the mood of our t ime is t h e odd and 
u n s t a b l e mix tu re of a sense of f r a g m e n t a t i o n and of an in te r lock ing sys tem t h a t 
deve lops acco rd ing to its own logic, and over which we do not seem to have any 
c o n t r o l . 
I also think t h e r e is a g r e a t deal of t r u t h in Alasdair M a c l n t y r e ' s c laim " t h a t to a 
la rge d e g r e e , peop le now th ink , t a lk , and a c t as j_f emotivism were t r u e , no m a t t e r 
what the i r avowed t h e o r e t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t may be"; and tha t while " the s u r f a c e r h e t o r i c 
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of our c u l t u r e is apt to speak c o m p l a c e n t l y of moral p lura l i sm," th is is too o f t e n a 
thinly disguised c o v e r - u p for moral c h a o s . Mac ln ty re may be r ight in sugges t ing t h a t 
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we have a l r eady e n t e r e d a new dark ages . But t he deeply fe l t need of our t imes is to 
b reak out of this "wild plural ism"—to c u l t i v a t e phrones is and r e f l e c t i v e i n t e l l i ngence , 
to learn to l i s t en , speak , and ac t with o the r s in mutual under s t and ing , a mutual 
unde r s t and ing t h a t can r e c o g n i z e and honor genuine d i f f e r e n c e s . This is what I t ake to 
be t h e c e n t r a l and most r e l e v a n t message of t he p ragmat ic unders tand ing of p lura l i sm. 
There is and can be no pe rmanen t solut ion to doing jus t i ce to the demands of 
commonal i ty and d i f f e r e n c e . "Wild plural ism" may even be a d i a l ec t i ca l necess i ty when 
t h e r e is a t h r e a t and bl indness to r ep res sed d i f f e r e n c e s . This is one reason why it is so 
appea l ing to all t hose who have s u f f e r e d from bl indnesses of those who p ronounce a 
f a l s e universa l ism and humanism. But such a wild pluralism harbors i ts own ominous 
d a n g e r s . As I read t h e c u r r e n t i n t e l l e c t u a l s cene , t h e r e is a growing a w a r e n e s s of 
t h e s e d a n g e r s . It is a lmost as if a f t e r a period of f l i r t a t i o n with the va r i e t i e s of wild 
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pluralism we a r e r e tu rn ing to t h e point of d e p a r t u r e of the p ragmat i c t h inke r s . 
There is a b e a u t i f u l r evea l ing passage in F reud ' s s tudy of Leonardo Da Vinci 
which c a p t u r e s the q u i n t e s s e n c e of t he p r agma t i c s ign i f i cance of what it means to live 
in a p lu ra l i s t i c un ive r se . Freud d e s c r i b e s Leonardo as fo l lows: 
A man who has begun to have an inkling of t he grandeur of the 
un iverse with all of i ts complex i t i e s and its laws readi ly f o r g e t s 
his own ins ign i f i can t s e l f . Lost in admi ra t ion and fi l led with t r u e 
humil i ty , he all too easi ly f o r g e t s t h a t he himself is a par t of 
t h e s e a c t i v e f o r c e s and t h a t in a c c o r d a n c e with the sca le of his 
personal s t r e n g t h the way is open for him to try to a l t e r a small 
por t ion of t h e des t ined c o u r s e of t he world—a world in w h i c j ^ t h e 
small is still no less wonde r fu l and s ign i f i can t than t h e g r e a t . 
Nothing would be more unpragmat i c—a viola t ion of t he p ragmat i c spiri t of 
Dewey—than the sugges t ion t h a t a r e t u r n to his t e x t s is s u f f i c i e n t to gain i l luminat ion 
and g u i d a n c e for c o n f r o n t i n g our problems and c o n f l i c t s . And I hope t h a t my apologia 
of Dewey and the p r a g m a t i s t s is not mis taken for this sort of r e t u r n . What can be 
r e c o v e r e d , rec la imed and a p p r o p r i a t e d is t he vision t h a t i n fo rms their th inking—a vision 
t h a t can of c o u r s e become empty and i r r e l e v a n t unless we seek new ways to 
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a p p r o p r i a t e it and to c o n f r o n t the p r a c t i c a l t a sks of f o s t e r i n g the t y p e of 
i n t e r p e n e t r a t i n g plural ism t h a t they a d v o c a t e d . 
IV. 
I have been speaking today pr imari ly as a phi losopher , but I sha re Dewey ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n tha t philosophy c a n be conce ived of as t he genera l t heo ry of e d u c a t i o n . And 
the t e n d e n c i e s to wild p lura l i sm, chaos , and con fus ion a re r e f l e c t e d in our e d u c a t i o n a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . We a r e in danger of losing any sense of common vision and pu rpose . We 
a r e pushed and pulled by the l a t e s t f ads and f a sh ions . We, too , have to seek common 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . We, too , must learn how to say "we" t oge the r—and not only to say it 
but to p r a c t i c e i t . 
I would like to conc lude with one of my f a v o r i t e quo t a t i ons f rom Dewey: 
As fa r as any plea is implicit in what has been said, it is , t h e n , a 
plea for c a s t i n g off of t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l t imidi ty which hampers the 
wings of imag ina t i on , a plea for s p e c u l a t i v e a u d a c i t y , for more 
f a i t h in ideas , s loughing off a coward ly r e l i a n c e upon those pa r t i a l 
ideas to which we a r e wont to give the name f a c t s . I have given 
to philosophy a more humble f u n c t i o n than t h a t which is o f t e n 
assigned to i t . But modesty as to i ts f inal p l a c e is not 
i ncompa t ib l e with boldness in the m a i n t e n a n c e of t h a t f u n c t i o n , 
humble as it may be . A combina t ion of such modesty and c o u r a g e 
a f f o r d s the only way I know of in which the p h i l o s o p h y can >look 
his f e l lowman in t h e f a c e with f r a n k n e s s and humani ty . 
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